



Overview Reynolds High School Active Shooter Response

After Action Report

December 2016

All Disasters Are Local

Mission: Working together to build resilient communities

Vision: Disaster Ready: Everyone, Everywhere


If a hurricane strikes, we can blame the president for not being there; we can blame Congress and FEMA; we can blame the state governments; but in the end, it's the mayors and the local city governments that have to be prepared for emergencies and be prepared to act.

- Michael Bloomberg



Preparedness Cycle

- Plan
- Equip
- Train
- Exercise
- Evaluate/Improve
 - Development of After Action Reports
 - Transparency of Findings



Key Contributors

- The Multnomah County Office of Emergency Management (MCEM) with initial assistance from the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) National Exercise Division (NED) drafted the Report.
- Final review was completed by the County, Reynolds School District and the County Sheriff's Office. Additional contributors include:
 - Multnomah Education Service District
 - Gresham Emergency Management
 - Gresham Police Department
 - Fairview Police Department
 - Troutdale Police Department
 - Gresham Fire Department
 - Beaverton Police Department Victim Services
 - Reynolds School District
 - American Red Cross
 - Trauma Intervention Programs, Inc.
 - Public Safety Chaplaincy



Incident Timeline

- At 8:05 a.m. on June 10, 2014, a student fired shots inside Reynolds High School in Troutdale, Oregon. The student, a lone gunman, entered the boys locker room adjacent to the school's gymnasium and used a rifle to shoot and kill a fellow student. The gunman also shot at and injured a teacher.
- At 8:06. Bureau of Emergency Communications (BOEC) received a 9-1-1 call and dispatched responders to the scene.
- At 8:08 a.m. Two School Resource Officers (SROs) entered the gymnasium building and likely interrupted the shooter, who fled into the boy's bathroom.
- At 8:09 a.m. Troutdale Police Department quickly set up an incident command post outside the north corner of the school where the shots were fired.
- At 8:14 a.m. The first search team entered the high school through the north doors and then entered the boy's bathroom where the shooter had remained. The officers approached the shooter and determined that he had been fatally wounded in what appeared to be a self-inflicted gunshot wound.
- Shortly thereafter, tactical teams began evacuating the school and leading students and staff to a staging area.
- Students were separated from their bags and broken into two groups, witness and non-witness groups.
- Witnesses were interviewed near the school. Non-witnesses were taken to a re-unification site in Wood Village. Bags were evaluated and transported to Reynolds Middle School.



Strengths

- **Initial Notification Strengths**

- Having School Resource Officers (SRO) onsite was critical for mitigating loss of life in response to the active shooter incident.
- The initial notification and response to the Reynolds High School incident was swift and timely.
- Both the City of Gresham and the Multnomah County Office of Emergency Management (MCEM) activated their Emergency Operations/Coordination Centers (EOC/EOC) upon notification of the active shooter incident.

- **Operational Coordination Strengths**

- Federal, state, county, school and city agencies worked together to respond to the active shooter incident, safely evacuating approximately 2,200 students and staff, and reunifying the students with their families.
- Prior planning on active shooter response facilitated the response by Troutdale Police Department (TPD), Gresham Police Department (GPD), and Gresham Fire and Emergency Services (GFES).
- The development and execution of the tactical operation plan by TPD resulted in a quick take-down of the suspect, and likely mitigated loss of life.
- Staff in the Multnomah County EOC worked quickly to fill resource requests and to document the event.
- MCEM quickly activated the EOC and staffed Emergency Support Function (ESF) #8 (Public Health & Medical Services).

- **Operational Communications Strengths**

- Although TPD and its response partners were on different radio frequencies, and therefore unable to communicate directly by radio, the appointment and utilization of a liaison (“runner”) to coordinate communications between response agencies allowed for continued communications.
- Reynolds School District’s (RSD) public messaging strategy was quickly developed and implemented – and included some key best practices that should be formalized into emergency plans and utilized during such incidents.



Strengths (Continued)

- **Fire/Life-Safety Operations Strengths**

- TPD and its response partners were able to leverage their strong working relationship to expedite response.
- GPD was quick to integrate with GFES and deploy rescue teams and was very receptive to their use.
- The inbound fire and emergency medical personnel dropped medical equipment at the rescue team staging area.
- GFES used fire engines and vehicles to create a shield/protective barrier for the MCP.

- **Reunification and Victim Services Strengths**

- SROs, Reynolds High School personnel, and behavioral health support resources were sent to the reunification site.
- The presence of medical services at the reunification site was beneficial.
- Communication and coordination among the various organizations that provided emotional support services to victims included a broad spectrum of providers and levels of services.
- Creating a Community Support Center and naming it as such as opposed to a mental health center contributed to its success.
- The CSC was adequately staffed with personnel from Multnomah County Department of County Human Services (DCHS), victim advocates, chaplains, Red Cross, Trauma Intervention Program (TIP), school counselors and others.
- Special needs students were evacuated first with their teachers and aides.

- **Public Information Strengths**

- The Public Information Officers (PIOs) in the Multnomah County EOC had the adaptability to deliver prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the affected community.
- RSD used VoIP technology to route calls from concerned parents/citizens to the district office.
- The PIOs used appropriate methods to relay potentially sensitive information regarding the shooting.
- Special equipment was left behind and proved a challenge to return to owners in a timely manner. While evacuating this population first, worked well for this incident, school and district administrators are consulting with subject matter experts regarding best practices. This action was likely due to proximity only.



Areas for Improvement

- **Initial Notification Areas for Improvement**
 - Activation of the school's lockdown procedures.
 - Notification procedure for activation of MCEM's EOC.
- **Operational Coordination Areas for Improvement**
 - Establishment of an Incident Command Structure at the incident site.
 - Non-traditional response partners in the Incident Command Structure.
 - Staging area for incoming resources.
 - Personal belongings during evacuation of school.
 - Existing plans for participating agencies and jurisdictions.
 - Coordination capacity of the Multnomah County EOC.
 - Roles and responsibilities of elected officials, external organizations, Departments/Divisions, and EOC staff, including delegation of authority.
 - Staffing of sections in the EOC.
 - Process for development of Common Operating Picture, shared situational awareness and critical information requirements.
 - Roles and responsibilities of each section within the EOC and their interoperability across sections.
 - Assistance request process.
 - Facilitation for debriefings and After Actions.
 - Accountability and resource management.
 - A staging area was eventually chosen by BOEC for the school incident site.



Areas for Improvement (Continued)

- **Operational Communications Areas for Improvement**
 - Use of unique unit monikers that can be input into the Computer Aided Dispatch, CAD system without necessitating the creation of additional calls.
 - Radio and cellular phone reception.
 - Process for development of Common Operating Picture, shared situational awareness.
 - Ability of dispatchers to identify the nature of the call.
 - Wireless data system coverage.
 - Access to School's secured wireless networks.
 - Cache of communications supplies and auxiliary equipment.
 - Communications between MCEM, the school district, and the responders on scene.
- **Fire/Life-Safety Operations Areas for Improvement**
 - Patient extraction with long backboards, mega movers, and skeds.
 - Understanding of how emergency response personnel will operate during acts of violence.
- **Reunification and Victim Services Areas for Improvement**
 - Reunification plans.
 - Methods for verifying custody.
 - Organizational structures for reunification locations.
 - Survivor Support Services (Behavioral Health/Emotional First Aid).
- **Public Information Areas for Improvement**
 - Establishment of a Joint Information System (JIS).
 - Coordination between JIS and County and County messaging to staff during acts of violence.
 - Utilization of Social Media.
 - Several people stated they were the Incident Commander for the reunification location.



Report Evaluation

- Conduct more joint training and exercises
- Operational co-location when possible for multidisciplinary responses
- More multi-organizational After Action Reports (possibly a county wide remedial action program)
- Ensure an environment exists where “areas for improvement” are not seen as “errors”

